Tapsearch Com EditorThe Enemy at Home review
April 11th 2007 08:30
Here is my review of Dinesh D'Souza's The Enemy at Home, originally published in Liberty:
Since September 11, 2001, pundits left and right have been rushing to tie their favorite political causes to the roots of Al Qaeda's anger. For religious conservatives such as Jerry Falwell, it was America’s sins that got Osama seeing red. For neocons, it was Clinton's intervention-happy but weak-willed foreign policy. For pacifists and historical grievance mongers, it was the history of Western domination of the Middle East – going back to the Crusades. For the "social justice" types it was “poverty.” And so on.
Political scientists have put together data on terrorists, looking at their stated goals, economic status, and countries of origin. They've even found a few correlations that shed light on the "root causes" of terrorism.
It's too bad that Dinesh D'Souza didn't take any of this research to heart before writing “The Enemy at Home.” He'd soon have realized that his central thesis, that cultural leftism is “responsible” for 9/11, doesn't stand up to scrutiny. It's doubly a shame because three-quarters of the book teems with important insights, analyses, and observations.
But first, to refute the thesis. D'Souza's view, as explained best in chapter three's subtitle, is that "foreign policy is not the main problem." Rather, the problem is that American cultural decadence enrages traditional people. Those who get particularly mad become terrorists, and others often provide tacit support.
One might expect, then, that the Muslim societies that have imported the most Western culture – D’Souza mentions Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia – would have exported the most terrorists. Whatever else sets these three countries apart, the supposed driving force of the phenomenon is most pronounced there. The traditionalists should be stark raving mad and disproportionately inclined to blow things up.
But in a different section of the book D'Souza summarizes an analysis of foreign insurgents caught in Iraq. Out of about 300, "78 were Egyptian, 66 Syrian, and 41 from the Sudan. Only 32 were Saudis [despite most of the 9/11 hijackers coming from Saudi Arabia]. The rest came from Jordan, Iran, Tunisia, Algeria, and the West Bank." If Western culture is the main temptation into terrorism, people from Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia must be good at resisting it, because they are able to live near discos without strapping bombs to their chests.
[Note: The edit of this piece removed Indonesia, I think because some Indonesian terrorists were in the news at the time. I believe, however, that the point still stands: Even if all three countries had some terrorists, you’d need to show they have more than their share to support D’Souza’s thesis. As the foreign insurgents study shows, that’s simply not the case.]
Scholarly analyses have reached conclusions that make more sense, even if they too can’t provide a complete explanation. Researchers have found that terrorists come from countries where (A) they cannot participate in government and (B) anger at foreign involvement gives them an alternative outlet.
Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova have argued for the former principle. They find that, statistically, "apart from population – larger countries tend to have more terrorists – the only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties."
From this they argue that terrorism is actually a form of political expression. When there is no legitimate way for angry citizens to make themselves heard, some of them seek other means. This is consistent with the fact that terrorists tend to be educated and well off, because these are the kinds of people who care most about politics.
Alberto Abadie came to similar conclusions, adding the nuance that the relationship doesn’t hold in cases of extreme authoritarianism – some countries are so repressive they actually squelch terrorism.
One might say that if a lack of rights is the problem, America should spread rights, through force if necessary. But there are tradeoffs to this approach as well.
The Defense Science Board noticed a historical link between intervention and terrorism in 1997, and the Cato Institute followed with a detailed report the next year. More recently journalist Afshin Molavi pointed out that the more a regime caters to U.S. interference, the more anti-American the regime's country becomes. Iran has one of the most pro-America populations in the Middle East.
Statistical work by Robert Pape found the same trend. In “Dying to Win,” he looked at 315 suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003. About 95 percent were linked to political objectives, and he argued that foreign occupation was terrorism’s primary cause.
This shouldn’t shock anyone. A terrorist does not choose the U.S., halfway around the globe, by throwing darts at a map. American leaders know (or should) that wedging themselves into a country's affairs is bound to create a backlash.
A plausible supporter of intervention will make the case that the benefits outweigh the costs, not that war has no costs and liberals are to blame for the problem. Democracies are less likely to breed terrorism, and it’s arguably worth war to try to establish a democracy in the Middle East. Even National Review columnist Jonah Goldberg conceded the point about costs and benefits when a National Intelligence Estimate found that the Iraq invasion increased terrorism:
"Confrontation tends to increase the chances of violence in the short term but decreases its likelihood in the long term. Any hunter will tell you that the most dangerous moment is when you've cornered an animal, and any cop will tell you that standing up to muggers puts you in danger."
Of course, no factor or even group of factors can explain 100 percent of terrorist activity. In “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” Robert Atlan criticized Pape’s work by pointing out the role of Muslim fanaticism – including martyrdom’s place in some interpretations of Islam – and the fact that some terrorist groups strike merely to compete with other terrorist groups for support. A Muslim-world Pew survey found a link between pro-terrorist beliefs and the notion that Islam is under threat.
So there’s plenty of room for one more factor, and D'Souza does a good job of showing that the cultural left did play some small role in 9/11, even if “responsibility” is too strong a word. He also demonstrates that popular foreign policies, both of the left and of the right, can hurt American interests.
D'Souza argues that left-wing values, when taken into the Muslim world against those societies’ wishes, give terrorists a rallying cry. This runs contrary to D’Souza’s idea that the cultural left causes terrorism in and of itself (especially when he comes right out and says, "As they see it, if we in America want to wreck our families and ruin the lives of our children, that is our choice"), but it's convincing nonetheless.
Liberal activists have taken on an international crusade that many mainstream Americans, to say nothing of devout Muslims, object to. Planned Parenthood has handed out “contraceptives to unmarried young girls in traditional cultures.” Women’s Link Worldwide opposes Muslim divorce and abortion laws in the interest of “human rights.” These efforts may not cause the very trend of terrorism, but it’s not unreasonable to point out that they’ve been great for recruiting.
Even Middle East objectives that most Americans applaud are problematic. Both the left and the right tend to support foreign leaders with Western values – the left because of civil liberties and the like, and the right because it thinks having such leaders in the Middle East is in our best interest. Activists across the spectrum support invasions that stop human rights abuses.
Pro-American leaders can help fight the War on Terror by sending troops and policing terrorism (a notion D'Souza chooses not to explore), but with the tradeoff that radical Muslims in those countries will hate America more.
Musharraf in Pakistan, Mubarak in Egypt and Abdullah in Jordan comprise D’Souza’s trinity of “Little Satans.” He says that “[t]hese dictators typically restrict or even eliminate Islamic laws and rules, replacing them with Western laws and institutions.” Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and bin Laden himself have publicly protested this phenomenon. Paradoxically, pro-America leaders have an anti-American effect.
And even if bashing Democrat-style foreign policy has been done to death, D’Souza impressively shows how poorly run, humanitarian-themed interventions can embolden terrorists. Jimmy Carter helped bring down the Shah of Iran because the foreign leader wasn’t liberal enough, and he ended up with Khomeini instead. Bill Clinton invaded Somalia in 1993 despite his unwillingness to deal with a backlash killing 18 soldiers. Terrorists saw these events and found that hitting America brought no consequences.
Bin Laden himself noted on a recruiting tape that the “paper tigers” “fled [Somalia] in the dark as fast as they could.” D’Souza takes all this to mean we should invade and follow through, but he provides all the facts needed to argue we should stay out altogether.
After imparting this wisdom, though, D'Souza returns to his suggestions for solving the problem. His main points here are that (A) the War on Terror must go on, with assurances to traditional Muslims that we’re trying to become a more moral people, and (B) conservatives don't link liberals to Osama bin Laden often enough.
The problem with the first assertion is not so much that it's wrong on its face – though the evidence continues to mount that it is, at least in Iraq – but that it is insufficiently argued. D’Souza makes a half-hearted case that the war is going better than the media let on. It is true the U.S. has built schools, held elections, etc. It's also true that civilian deaths might have been higher if Saddam were still in power, tossing dissidents into mass graves at will. What's needed, though, is a cost-benefit analysis that pits the war's accomplishments against its price in American soldiers' lives, increased terrorism, money, and injured U.S. world standing. There is none.
The second recommendation is by far the book's most shocking. D’Souza notes that both Osama bin Laden and the American left would like the U.S. out of the Middle East (here and throughout his book he ignores “Old Right”-style anti-interventionists). He argues that the Right should point this out at every opportunity. But the biggest problem is that D'Souza's own recommendations are often consistent with bin Laden's objectives. For example, the pundit and the terrorist leader would both like to see a more wholesome America; indeed, the point of “The Enemy at Home” is to encourage such a cultural shift. D’Souza spends an inordinate amount of space pointing out how “Will and Grace,” Eminem and Howard Stern endorse despicable values, arguing that if these folks toned it down, traditional Muslims would be less inclined to quietly support terror.
So liberals are not alone in espousing a "give them what they want and they'll leave us alone" strategy. Those on the left simply choose a different avenue of appeasement.
Also, Americans have been known to see these kinds of attacks as cheap shots. For example, Democrat Senator Tim Johnson (S.D.) once referred to the "Taliban wing of the Republican Party." He’s admitted it was a mistake. See also Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin’s (D) comments comparing Guantanamo Bay to Nazi concentration camps and the Soviet gulag, and his apology.
Despite these often severe flaws, “The Enemy at Home” is a worthwhile read. Sandwiched between an empirically false thesis and questionable policy recommendations are some terrific factoids and arguments regarding the Middle East and its culture.
By Robert VerBruggen
Since September 11, 2001, pundits left and right have been rushing to tie their favorite political causes to the roots of Al Qaeda's anger. For religious conservatives such as Jerry Falwell, it was America’s sins that got Osama seeing red. For neocons, it was Clinton's intervention-happy but weak-willed foreign policy. For pacifists and historical grievance mongers, it was the history of Western domination of the Middle East – going back to the Crusades. For the "social justice" types it was “poverty.” And so on.
Political scientists have put together data on terrorists, looking at their stated goals, economic status, and countries of origin. They've even found a few correlations that shed light on the "root causes" of terrorism.
It's too bad that Dinesh D'Souza didn't take any of this research to heart before writing “The Enemy at Home.” He'd soon have realized that his central thesis, that cultural leftism is “responsible” for 9/11, doesn't stand up to scrutiny. It's doubly a shame because three-quarters of the book teems with important insights, analyses, and observations.
But first, to refute the thesis. D'Souza's view, as explained best in chapter three's subtitle, is that "foreign policy is not the main problem." Rather, the problem is that American cultural decadence enrages traditional people. Those who get particularly mad become terrorists, and others often provide tacit support.
One might expect, then, that the Muslim societies that have imported the most Western culture – D’Souza mentions Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia – would have exported the most terrorists. Whatever else sets these three countries apart, the supposed driving force of the phenomenon is most pronounced there. The traditionalists should be stark raving mad and disproportionately inclined to blow things up.
But in a different section of the book D'Souza summarizes an analysis of foreign insurgents caught in Iraq. Out of about 300, "78 were Egyptian, 66 Syrian, and 41 from the Sudan. Only 32 were Saudis [despite most of the 9/11 hijackers coming from Saudi Arabia]. The rest came from Jordan, Iran, Tunisia, Algeria, and the West Bank." If Western culture is the main temptation into terrorism, people from Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia must be good at resisting it, because they are able to live near discos without strapping bombs to their chests.
[Note: The edit of this piece removed Indonesia, I think because some Indonesian terrorists were in the news at the time. I believe, however, that the point still stands: Even if all three countries had some terrorists, you’d need to show they have more than their share to support D’Souza’s thesis. As the foreign insurgents study shows, that’s simply not the case.]
Scholarly analyses have reached conclusions that make more sense, even if they too can’t provide a complete explanation. Researchers have found that terrorists come from countries where (A) they cannot participate in government and (B) anger at foreign involvement gives them an alternative outlet.
Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova have argued for the former principle. They find that, statistically, "apart from population – larger countries tend to have more terrorists – the only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties."
From this they argue that terrorism is actually a form of political expression. When there is no legitimate way for angry citizens to make themselves heard, some of them seek other means. This is consistent with the fact that terrorists tend to be educated and well off, because these are the kinds of people who care most about politics.
Alberto Abadie came to similar conclusions, adding the nuance that the relationship doesn’t hold in cases of extreme authoritarianism – some countries are so repressive they actually squelch terrorism.
One might say that if a lack of rights is the problem, America should spread rights, through force if necessary. But there are tradeoffs to this approach as well.
The Defense Science Board noticed a historical link between intervention and terrorism in 1997, and the Cato Institute followed with a detailed report the next year. More recently journalist Afshin Molavi pointed out that the more a regime caters to U.S. interference, the more anti-American the regime's country becomes. Iran has one of the most pro-America populations in the Middle East.
Statistical work by Robert Pape found the same trend. In “Dying to Win,” he looked at 315 suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003. About 95 percent were linked to political objectives, and he argued that foreign occupation was terrorism’s primary cause.
This shouldn’t shock anyone. A terrorist does not choose the U.S., halfway around the globe, by throwing darts at a map. American leaders know (or should) that wedging themselves into a country's affairs is bound to create a backlash.
A plausible supporter of intervention will make the case that the benefits outweigh the costs, not that war has no costs and liberals are to blame for the problem. Democracies are less likely to breed terrorism, and it’s arguably worth war to try to establish a democracy in the Middle East. Even National Review columnist Jonah Goldberg conceded the point about costs and benefits when a National Intelligence Estimate found that the Iraq invasion increased terrorism:
"Confrontation tends to increase the chances of violence in the short term but decreases its likelihood in the long term. Any hunter will tell you that the most dangerous moment is when you've cornered an animal, and any cop will tell you that standing up to muggers puts you in danger."
Of course, no factor or even group of factors can explain 100 percent of terrorist activity. In “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” Robert Atlan criticized Pape’s work by pointing out the role of Muslim fanaticism – including martyrdom’s place in some interpretations of Islam – and the fact that some terrorist groups strike merely to compete with other terrorist groups for support. A Muslim-world Pew survey found a link between pro-terrorist beliefs and the notion that Islam is under threat.
So there’s plenty of room for one more factor, and D'Souza does a good job of showing that the cultural left did play some small role in 9/11, even if “responsibility” is too strong a word. He also demonstrates that popular foreign policies, both of the left and of the right, can hurt American interests.
D'Souza argues that left-wing values, when taken into the Muslim world against those societies’ wishes, give terrorists a rallying cry. This runs contrary to D’Souza’s idea that the cultural left causes terrorism in and of itself (especially when he comes right out and says, "As they see it, if we in America want to wreck our families and ruin the lives of our children, that is our choice"), but it's convincing nonetheless.
Liberal activists have taken on an international crusade that many mainstream Americans, to say nothing of devout Muslims, object to. Planned Parenthood has handed out “contraceptives to unmarried young girls in traditional cultures.” Women’s Link Worldwide opposes Muslim divorce and abortion laws in the interest of “human rights.” These efforts may not cause the very trend of terrorism, but it’s not unreasonable to point out that they’ve been great for recruiting.
Even Middle East objectives that most Americans applaud are problematic. Both the left and the right tend to support foreign leaders with Western values – the left because of civil liberties and the like, and the right because it thinks having such leaders in the Middle East is in our best interest. Activists across the spectrum support invasions that stop human rights abuses.
Pro-American leaders can help fight the War on Terror by sending troops and policing terrorism (a notion D'Souza chooses not to explore), but with the tradeoff that radical Muslims in those countries will hate America more.
Musharraf in Pakistan, Mubarak in Egypt and Abdullah in Jordan comprise D’Souza’s trinity of “Little Satans.” He says that “[t]hese dictators typically restrict or even eliminate Islamic laws and rules, replacing them with Western laws and institutions.” Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and bin Laden himself have publicly protested this phenomenon. Paradoxically, pro-America leaders have an anti-American effect.
And even if bashing Democrat-style foreign policy has been done to death, D’Souza impressively shows how poorly run, humanitarian-themed interventions can embolden terrorists. Jimmy Carter helped bring down the Shah of Iran because the foreign leader wasn’t liberal enough, and he ended up with Khomeini instead. Bill Clinton invaded Somalia in 1993 despite his unwillingness to deal with a backlash killing 18 soldiers. Terrorists saw these events and found that hitting America brought no consequences.
Bin Laden himself noted on a recruiting tape that the “paper tigers” “fled [Somalia] in the dark as fast as they could.” D’Souza takes all this to mean we should invade and follow through, but he provides all the facts needed to argue we should stay out altogether.
After imparting this wisdom, though, D'Souza returns to his suggestions for solving the problem. His main points here are that (A) the War on Terror must go on, with assurances to traditional Muslims that we’re trying to become a more moral people, and (B) conservatives don't link liberals to Osama bin Laden often enough.
The problem with the first assertion is not so much that it's wrong on its face – though the evidence continues to mount that it is, at least in Iraq – but that it is insufficiently argued. D’Souza makes a half-hearted case that the war is going better than the media let on. It is true the U.S. has built schools, held elections, etc. It's also true that civilian deaths might have been higher if Saddam were still in power, tossing dissidents into mass graves at will. What's needed, though, is a cost-benefit analysis that pits the war's accomplishments against its price in American soldiers' lives, increased terrorism, money, and injured U.S. world standing. There is none.
The second recommendation is by far the book's most shocking. D’Souza notes that both Osama bin Laden and the American left would like the U.S. out of the Middle East (here and throughout his book he ignores “Old Right”-style anti-interventionists). He argues that the Right should point this out at every opportunity. But the biggest problem is that D'Souza's own recommendations are often consistent with bin Laden's objectives. For example, the pundit and the terrorist leader would both like to see a more wholesome America; indeed, the point of “The Enemy at Home” is to encourage such a cultural shift. D’Souza spends an inordinate amount of space pointing out how “Will and Grace,” Eminem and Howard Stern endorse despicable values, arguing that if these folks toned it down, traditional Muslims would be less inclined to quietly support terror.
So liberals are not alone in espousing a "give them what they want and they'll leave us alone" strategy. Those on the left simply choose a different avenue of appeasement.
Also, Americans have been known to see these kinds of attacks as cheap shots. For example, Democrat Senator Tim Johnson (S.D.) once referred to the "Taliban wing of the Republican Party." He’s admitted it was a mistake. See also Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin’s (D) comments comparing Guantanamo Bay to Nazi concentration camps and the Soviet gulag, and his apology.
Despite these often severe flaws, “The Enemy at Home” is a worthwhile read. Sandwiched between an empirically false thesis and questionable policy recommendations are some terrific factoids and arguments regarding the Middle East and its culture.
By Robert VerBruggen
| 39 |
| Vote |
Add To: 
Subscribe to this blog
Comment by JohnDoe
Film & TV on DVD